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Abstract
We propose a probabilistic variant of the pi-calculus as a framework to specify randomized security protocols and their intended
properties. In order to express and verify the correctness of the protocols, we develop a probabilistic version of the testing semantics.
We then illustrate these concepts on an extended example: the Partial Secret Exchange, a protocol which uses a randomized
primitive, the Oblivious Transfer, to achieve fairness of information exchange between two parties.
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1. Introduction
Probabilistic security protocols involve probabilistic choices and are used for many purposes including signing
contracts, sending certified email and protecting the anonymity of communication agents. Some probabilistic protocols
rely on specific random primitives such as the Oblivious Transfer [14]. There are various examples in this category,
notably the contract signing protocol in [6] and the privacy-preserving auction protocol in [9].
A large effort has been dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols, and several approaches based
on process-calculi techniques have been proposed. However, in the particular case of probabilistic protocols, they
have been analyzed mainly by using model checking methods, while only few attempts of applying process-
calculi techniques have been made. One proposal of this kind is [2], which defines a probabilistic version of the
noninterference property, and uses a probabilistic variant of CCS and of bisimulation to analyze protocols wrt this
property.
In this paper we present a framework for analyzing probabilistic security protocols by using the piprob-calculus, a
probabilistic extension of the pi -calculus inspired by the work in [7]. In order to express security properties in this
calculus, we extend the notion of testing equivalence [10] to the probabilistic setting. We propose a preorder based on
the probability of passing a certain class of tests: a process P is considered smaller than a process Q, written P v Q,
if, for each test, the probability of passing the test is smaller for P than for Q. Following the lines of [1], a test can
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be seen as an adversary who interacts with an agent in order to break some security property. In order to check that a
protocol P satisfies a security property, then, we can create a specification Q which “obviously satisfies” the property
and show that P v Q. If this holds, then the adversary has smaller probability of succeeding with the protocol than
with the specification, so the protocol is correct with respect to the intended property.
From a pragmatic point of view, if the protocol P is given, then it is best to construct a specification P ′ which has
the same structure than P . This is becausev is actually a congruence, so we can prove that P v P ′ in a compositional
way. This step can be repeated until we have a specification Q which is “obviously correct”. In other words, we may
construct several intermediate specifications: P = P1, P2, . . . , Pn = Q where for each i we prove Pi v Pi+1, and Q
is obviously satisfying the specification.
We illustrate the framework with an extended example of fair exchange protocol, where the property to verify is
fairness. In this kind of protocol two agents, A and B, want to exchange information simultaneously, namely each
of them is willing to send its secrets only if he receives the ones of the other party. We consider the Partial Secrets
Exchange protocol (PSE, [6]) which uses the Oblivious Transfer as its main primitive. An important characteristic of
the fair exchange protocols is that the adversary is in fact one of the agents and not an external party. As a consequence
the behavior of A will be different when B behaves normally from the case in which B is trying to cheat. After
encoding the protocol in the piprob-calculus, we give a specification which models the behavior of A. We then express
fairness by means of a testing relation between the protocol and the specification and we prove that it holds.
Note that a proof of the correctness of PSE was already given in [6], but it was rather informal and relied on
intuition. In contrast, the proof given in this paper is rigorous and detailed, as it relies on a framework (the semantics
of the probabilistic pi -calculus) which is completely formalized. Additionally, the method for proving P v P ′ can be
automatized, at least in part.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce piprob, our variant of the probabilistic
pi -calculus. We present its semantics and propose a notion of probabilistic testing preorder. In Section 3 we illustrate
the Oblivious Transfer primitive, the Partial Secrets Exchange protocol (PSE), and their encoding in the piprob-calculus.
In Section 4 we specify the fairness property and we prove the correctness of PSE. In Section 5 we discuss related
work, notably the analysis of the PSE protocol using probabilistic model checking. Finally, Section 6 concludes and
presents some ideas for future work.
A preliminary version of this paper, without proofs, appeared in [3]. Apart from the addition of the proofs, this
paper differs from the preliminary version in the fact that there is now a unique specification for the PSE protocol,
instead of many specifications depending on how the partner may cheat. Consequently the correctness proof gets more
convincing and simplified.
2. A probabilistic variant of the pi -calculus
In this section we define a probabilistic process calculus suitable for implementing security protocols. This calculus,
which will be referred as the piprob-calculus, is a probabilistic extension of the pi -calculus, similar to the probabilistic
asynchronous pi -calculus presented in [7].
A common feature of piprob and the calculus in [7] is that there is a distinction between probabilistic and
nondeterministic behavior. The former, represented by the choice operator, is associated with the random choices
performed by the process itself. The latter, represented by the parallel operator, is related to the decisions of an
external scheduler.
The piprob-calculus differs from the calculus in [7] in that it allows only blind (probabilistic) choices. This
simplifies considerably semantics and reasoning, while the calculus remains rich enough to model probabilistic
security protocols. Furthermore, the piprob-calculus contains some extra constructs, like output prefix and pair splitting,
that are useful to express the protocols we have considered.
We could also add certain cryptographic primitives like the shared-key encryption of the spi-calculus, however this
is not necessary for the protocols considered in this paper.
2.1. Syntax
Let x, y range over a countable set of variables and n,m over a countable set of channel names. The terms and
processes of the piprob-calculus are defined by the grammar displayed in Fig. 1. The distinction between variables and
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M, N ::= terms
x variable
| n name
| 〈M, N 〉 pair
P, Q ::= processes
MN .P output
| M(x).P input
| P | Q composition
| ∑i pi Pi prob. choice| νnP restriction
| !P replication
| [M is N ]P match
| let 〈x, y〉 = M in P pair splitting
| 0 nil
Fig. 1. Syntax of piprob-calculus.
channel names does not exist in the original pi -calculus but simplifies the treatment of some relations. Note also that
for notational simplicity we will sometimes use M . to represent the prefix Mn. where n is some fixed name.
2.2. Probabilistic automata
The semantics of piprob is based on the Segala and Lynch’s version of Probabilistic Automata, which was introduced
in [15]. We briefly recall here the main notions, simplified and adapted for our needs.
A discrete probabilistic space is a pair (X, pb) where X is a set and pb a function pb : X 7→ (0, 1] s.t.∑
x∈X pb(x) = 1. Given a set Y we define the set of all probabilistic spaces on Y :
Prob(Y ) = {(X, pb) | X ⊆ Y and (X, pb) is a discrete probabilistic space}.
Let S be a set of states and A a set of actions. A probabilistic automaton is a triple (S, T , s0) where s0 ∈ S (initial
state) and T ⊆ S × Prob(A × S). The elements of T are called transition groups or steps. The idea is that the choice
between transition groups is made nondeterministically by an external scheduler while the choice of a transition within
a group is made probabilistically by the process itself.1
Given a probabilistic automaton M = (S, T , s0) we define tree(M) as the tree obtained by unfolding the transition
system. The root n0 of tree(M) is labeled by s0 and if n is a node labeled by s then for each (s, (X, pb)) ∈ T and
each (µ, s′) ∈ X there is a node n′ labeled by s′ and an arc from n to n′ labeled by µ and pb(µ, s′).
A scheduler ζ is a function which solves the nondeterminism by selecting, at each moment of the computation, a
transition group among the ones allowed at the current state. The execution tree of an automaton M under a scheduler
ζ , denoted by etree(M, ζ ) is the tree obtained from tree(M) by pruning all the arcs corresponding to transitions in
groups not selected by ζ .
2.3. Semantics of piprob
The operational semantics of the piprob-calculus is given by means of probabilistic automata defined inductively on
the basis of the syntax. In order to simplify the notation, we write
s{ µi−→
pi
si | i ∈ I }
iff (s, ({(µi , si ) | i ∈ I }, pb)) ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I : pi = pb(µi , si ), where I is an index set. When I is not relevant we
will use the notation s { µi−→
pi
si }i .
The transitions of the automaton associated with a process are defined by the rules in Fig. 2.
The behavior of the choice operator is defined by the SUM rule. The transition to every member of the sum is
possible with a τ action (blind choice). Note that all transitions belong to the same group which means that the choice
1 For piprob we actually need only a subset of P.A., namely we can restrict to the case in which the second component of a transition is either
a singleton (a probabilistic distribution which is 1 on exactly one pair label-state) or it is a distribution which is positive only on τ labels. This
restricted class of automata is similar (although not identical) to the so-called simple probabilistic automata.
K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi / Theoretical Computer Science 389 (2007) 512–527 515
IN m(x).P {m(x)−→
1
P} OUT mM.P { mM−→
1
P}
SUM
∑
i pi Pi { τ−→pi Pi }i OPEN
P { mn−→
1
P ′}
νnP {m(n)−→
1
P ′}
m 6= n
RES1
P { µ−→
1
P ′}
νnP { µ−→
1
νnP ′}
µ6=τ,
n /∈nm(µ) RES2
P { τ−→
pi
Pi }i
νnP { τ−→
pi
νnPi }i
COM
P { mM−→
1
P ′} Q {m(x)−→
1
Q′}
P | Q { τ−→
1
P ′ | Q′[M/x]} PAR
P { µi−→
pi
Pi }i
P | Q { µi−→
pi
Pi | Q}i
∀i fn(µi ) ∩ bn(Q) = ∅
CLOSE
P {m(n)−→
1
P ′} Q {m(x)−→
1
Q′}
P | Q { τ−→
1
νn(P ′ | Q′[n/x])} CONG
P ≡ P ′ P ′ { µi−→
pi
Q′i }i ∀i.Q′i ≡ Qi
P { µi−→
pi
Qi }i
Fig. 2. The late-instantiation semantics of the piprob-calculus. The functions f n, bn and nm give the free, bound and total names of their arguments
respectively.
is not controlled by the scheduler but is made by the process itself. IN and OUT are self-explanatory. The RES rules
model restriction on channel n: actions on that channel are not allowed by the restricted process. Note that we have two
rules for the sake of clarity: for the transition groups which contain only τ actions there is no need to check the channel
name. PAR models interleaving, in which each process maintains its transition groups. COM models communication
by handshaking. Since input/output transitions are always alone in their group, this rule is rather simple and very
similar to the nonprobabilistic case. CLOSE is similar to COM but works together with OPEN in order to implement
scope extrusion, that is the transfer of a new channel name between processes. Finally CONG states that equivalent
processes perform the same actions. The structural equivalence ≡ used in CONG is defined as follows:
(α-renaming) P ≡ Q iff P ≡α Q P | Q ≡ Q | P
P | 0 ≡ P !P ≡ P | !P
let 〈x, y〉 = 〈M, N 〉 in P ≡ P[M/x][N/y] [M is M]P ≡ P.
In the following sections we define some relations between piprob-processes which will help us to express some
properties of probabilistic protocols and reasoning about them. We will also examine some properties of these
relations.
2.4. Testing relations between piprob-processes
Testing is a well-known method of comparing processes, resulting in equivalences weaker than the ones of the
bisimulation family. The idea, proposed by De Nicola and Hennessy [10], is that two processes are equivalent if they
both pass the same set of tests. A test is a process running in parallel with the one being tested and which can perform
a distinguished action ω that represents success. This idea is very useful for the analysis of security protocols, as
suggested in [1], since a test can be seen as an adversary who interferes with a communication agent and declares his
success with an ω action. Then two processes are testing equivalent if they are vulnerable to the same attacks.
In the probabilistic setting there are different approaches for defining testing equivalence. For example [13]
proposes a probabilistic extension of testing equivalence which considers the ability of each process to pass a test
with nonzero probability (may-testing) or probability 1 (must testing). However, when analyzing security protocols
we are not only interested in the ability of passing a test, but also in the exact probability of success. Thus our definition
resembles more the one of [8] and the result is no longer an equivalence but a preorder.
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We start by defining the probability of a set of executions. Given a probabilistic automaton M and a scheduler ζ ,
an execution fragment ξ is a path (finite or infinite) from the root of etree(M, ζ ). The probability of an execution
fragment ξ = n0 µ0−→
p0
n1
µ1−→
p1
n2
µ2−→
p2
· · · is defined as pb(ξ) = ∏i pi . An execution is a maximal execution
fragment. The set of all executions of M under ζ is denoted by exec(M, ζ ).
Given an execution fragment ξ , a cone with prefix ξ is defined as Cξ = {ξ ′ ∈ exec(M, ζ ) | ξ ≤ ξ ′} where
≤ is the prefix relation. We define pb(Cξ ) = pb(ξ). Let {Ci }i∈I be a countable set of disjoint cones. We define
pb(
⋃
i∈I Ci ) =
∑
i∈I pb(Ci ). We can show that this probability is well defined, that is two different sets of disjoint
cones with the same union give the same probability.
A test O is a piprob-calculus process able to perform a distinguished action ω. An interaction between O and
a process P is a sequence of τ transitions starting from P | O . In order to allow only τ actions we define
νP = νn1 . . . νnk P , where n1, . . . , nk are all the free names in P . Then an interaction between P and O is an
element of exec(ν(P | O), ζ )2:
ν(P | O) = Q0 τ−→
p0
Q1
τ−→
p1
Q2
τ−→
p2
· · · .
An interaction ξ is successful if Qi
ω−→
p
for some i . Let sexec(ν(P | O), ζ ) = {ξ ∈ exec(ν(P | O), ζ ) | ξ is successful}.
This set can be obtained as a countable union of disjoint cones [7], so the probability of a successful execution can be
defined as pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ )).
We now define the upper and lower probability for P to pass O .
Definition 1. Let P be a process and O a test. We define
PdOe = sup{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ )) | ζ is a scheduler}
PbOc = inf{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ )) | ζ is a scheduler}.
Then we define the testing preorders for piprob-processes.
Definition 2. Let P, Q be processes. We define must and may-testing preorders as follows:
P v may Q iff for all tests O : PdOe ≤ QdOe
P v must Q iff for all tests O : PbOc ≤ QbOc.
In this paper we will only use may-testing to express safety properties of security protocols, so we will write just
v for v may .
Finally we define a useful preorder between pairs of processes:
Definition 3. Let P1, P2, Q1, Q2 be processes. We define the relation vp between pairs of processes as follows
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2) iff P1 +p P2 v Q1 +p Q2
where P1 +p P2 stands for∑2i=1 pi Pi with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p.
2.5. Properties of testing preorders
In this section we examine some properties of the previously defined relations. The following lemma is very useful
for reasoning about the upper probability of passing a test. It crucially relies on the fact that in piprob probabilistic
choices are blind.
Lemma 4. Let P, Q be piprob-processes and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then for all tests O
P +p QdOe = pPdOe + (1− p)QdOe.
2 With a slight abuse of notation we will sometimes use a process to denote its corresponding probabilistic automaton.
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Proof. We will write P(O, ζ ) for pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ )). Firstly we prove that
∃ζ : P +p Q(O, ζ ) = pi ⇔ ∃ζ1, ζ2 : pP(O, ζ1)+ (1− p)Q(O, ζ2) = pi (1)
(⇒) we can construct a scheduler ζ ′ which performs the choice first and then imitates ζ . It is easy to see that
P +p Q(O, ζ ) = P +p Q(O, ζ ′). Moreover all executions of P +p Q | O under ζ ′ will start with one of the
following transitions:
P +p Q | O τ−→
1
P | O P +p Q | O τ−→
1−p Q | O
and continue with an execution of P | O or Q|O . Thus P(O, ζ ′) = pP(O, ζ1)+ (1− p)Q(O, ζ2) = pi , where ζ1, ζ2
are schedulers which imitate ζ ′ after the choice.
(⇐) we use for ζ a scheduler which first selects to do the choice P +p Q and then imitates ζ1 or ζ2 depending on the
outcome of the choice.
Now let A = pPdOe + (1− p)QdOe and suppose that A 6= sup{P +p Q(O, ζ ) | ζ }. Then, by definition of sup,
one of the following must hold.
(1) ∃ζ : P +p Q(O, ζ ) > A. Then by (1) ∃ζ1, ζ2 : pP(O, ζ1) + (1 − p)Q(O, ζ2) > A, so P(O, ζ1) > PdOe or
Q(O, ζ2) > QdOe which is a contradiction.
(2) ∃A′ < A s.t. ∀ζ : P(O, ζ ) ≤ A′. Let  < A − A′. Since PdOe, QdOe are the sup of the corresponding sets,
there exist ζ1, ζ2 s.t. pP(O, ζ1)+ (1− p)Q(O, ζ2) > A− e. By (1) ∃ζ : P +p Q(O, ζ ) > A− e > A′ which is
a also contradiction. 
A context C is a process containing a “hole”. We will denote by C[P] the process obtained by replacing the hole
in C by P . A preorder is a precongruence if it is closed under any context. May-testing is not a precongruence on
arbitrary processes since for P = [x is y]P ′, Q = [x is z]Q′,C = n(x).[ ], we have P v Q but C[P] v C[Q] does
not hold for all P ′, Q′. However all previous relations become precongruences if we restrict to closed processes.
Definition 5. A process is called closed if it contains no free variables.
Remark 6. Because of the distinction between variables and channel names, a closed process can still have free
channel names and therefore be able to communicate with the environment.
Lemma 7. v is a precongruence on closed processes.
Proof. Instead of proving directly the congruence of v we will use the notion of open extension of a relation. If R is
a relation on closed processes, we define its open extension R◦ on arbitrary processes as P R◦ Q iff Pσ R Qσ for
all substitutions σ such that Pσ, Qσ are closed. We now prove that v◦ is a congruence.
Let P, Q be processes such that P v◦ Q. By the definition of v◦ we have:
∀O∀σ PσdOe ≤ QσdOe. (2)
The proof is done by induction on the structure of C . The base case (C = []) is trivial. For the inductive step, we can
apply the induction hypothesis to each sub-context, so we need only examine the following cases.
(1) C = [] | R. The process Rσ | O is by itself a test and it is easy to see that ∀X : X | RσdOe = XdRσ | Oe. So
we have:
(Pσ | Rσ)dOe = PσdRσ | Oe ≤ QσdRσ | Oe = (Qσ | Rσ)dOe
thus C[P] v◦ C[Q].
(2) C = [] +k R. We have
(Pσ +k Rσ)dOe = kPσdOe + (1− k)RσdOe Lemma 4
≤ kQσdOe + (1− k)RσdOe (2)
= (Qσ +k Rσ)dOe Lemma 4
thus C[P] v◦ C[Q].
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(3) C = M(x).[]. Firstly we α-rename C[X ] to M(x ′).X ′ where x ′ is a fresh variable and X ′ = X [x ′/x]. By applying
a substitution σ we get Mσ(x ′).X ′σ .
Without loss of generality we are considering tests which are not performing any actions by themselves before
interacting with the tested process. So all applications of a test O to Mσ(x ′).X ′σ will start with the following
transition:
ν(Mσ(x ′).X ′σ | O) τ−→
1
ν(X ′σ [N/x ′] | O ′).
Since the probability of this transition is 1 we have
(Mσ(x ′).X ′σ)dOe = X ′σ [N/x ′]dO ′e. (3)
Finally (note that σ [N/x ′] is a substitution)
Mσ(x ′).P ′σdOe = P ′σ [N/x ′]dO ′e (3)
≤ Q′σ [N/x ′]dO ′e (2)
= Mσ(x ′).Q′σdOe (3)
= C[Q]σdOe (α-conv)
thus C[P] v◦ C[Q].
(4) C = MN .[]. Similar to the previous case.
(5) C =![]. First we prove that
Pn v◦ Qn,∀n ≥ 1 (4)
where Pn = P | . . . | P (n times). The proof is by induction on n and the inductive case is similar to case 1
above (considering P | O and Pn | O as tests).
Now suppose that !PσdOe >!QσdOe. By choosing a sufficiently large n we can approximate !P, !Q with
Pn, Qn without invalidating the above inequality, which is contradictory to (4).
(6) C = [M is N ][]. We have C[X ]σ = [Mσ is Nσ ]Xσ .
If Mσ = Nσ then
[Mσ is Nσ ]Xσ ≡ Xσ. (5)
Thus
([Mσ is Nσ ]Pσ)dOe = PσdOe (5)
≤ QσdOe (2)
= ([Mσ is Nσ ]Qσ)dOe. (5)
If Mσ 6= Nσ then [Mσ is Nσ ]Xσ ≡ 0 so
C[P]σ ≡ C[Q]σ
and the relation still holds.
(7) C = let 〈x, y〉 = M in []. Similar to the previous case.
We showed that v◦ is a precongruence, and for any relationR ifR◦ is a precongruence on open processes thenR
is a precongruence on closed processes. 
The following lemma states that all probabilistic choices can be made in the beginning of the execution.
Lemma 8. Let P, Q be piprob-processes and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then for all contexts C:
C[P +p Q] ≈ C[P] +p C[Q]
where ≈ is the equivalence induced by v.
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Proof. Let O be a test. If the execution of C[P +p Q] | O does not contain the transition of P +p Q to one of its
operands then C[P +p Q]dOe = C[P]dOe = C[Q]dOe and the result comes immediately from Lemma 4.
If not, we show that for each execution C[P+p Q] | O →→
r
R there is an execution (C[P]+pC[Q]) | O →→
r
R
with the same probability. Since the execution contains a transition of P +p Q it will be of the form:
C[P +p Q] | O →→
r1
C1[P +p Q] −→
p
C1[P] →→
r2
R
(or correspondingly for Q). The probability of this execution is r1 · p · r2. We can create an execution of the same
probability for (C[P] +p C[Q]) | O as follows:
(C[P] +p C[Q]) | O −→
p
C[P] | O →→
r1
C1[P] | O →→
r2
R. 
Finally, the following corollary is a consequence of Lemmas 7 and 8.
Corollary 9. vp is a precongruence on closed processes, that is for all contexts C and all closed processes
P1, P2, Q1, Q2
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2)⇒ (C[P1],C[P2]) vp (C[Q1],C[Q2]).
Proof. Let P1, P2, Q1, Q2 be processes such that P1+p P2 v Q1+p Q2 and C be a context. Sincev is a congruence
we have C[P1 +p P2] v C[Q1 +p Q2] and by Lemma 8 C[P1] +p C[P2] v C[Q1] +p C[Q2]. 
3. Probabilistic security protocols
In this section we discuss probabilistic security protocols based on the Oblivious Transfer and we show how to
model them using the piprob-calculus.
3.1. 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
The Oblivious Transfer is a primitive operation used in various probabilistic security protocols. In this particular
version a sender A sends exactly one of the messages M1,M2 to a receiver B. The latter receives i and Mi where i
is 1 or 2, each with probability 1/2. Moreover A should get no information about which message was received by B.
More precisely the protocol OT 12 (A, B,M1,M2) should satisfy the following conditions:
(1) If A executes OT 12 (A, B,M1,M2) properly then B receives exactly one message, (1,M1) or (2,M2), each with
probability 1/2.
(2) After the execution of OT 12 (A, B,M1,M2), if it is properly executed, for A the probability that B got Mi remains
1/2.
(3) If A deviates from the protocol, in order to increase his probability of learning what B received, then B can detect
his attempt with probability at least 1/2.
It is worth noting that in the literature the reception of the index i by B is often not mentioned, at least not
explicitly [6]. However, omitting the index can lead to possible attacks. Consider the case where A executes (properly)
OT 12 (M1,M1). Then B will receive M1 with probability 1, but he cannot distinguish it from the case where he receives
M1 as a result of OT 12 (M1,M2). So A is forcing B to receive M1. We will see that, in the case of the PSE protocol,
A could exploit this situation in order to get an unfair advantage. Note that the condition (3) does not apply to this
situation since this cannot be considered as a deviation from the Oblivious Transfer. A generic implementation of the
Oblivious Transfer could not detect such behavior since A executes OT properly, the problem lies only in the data
being transferred.
Using the indexes, however, solves the problem since B will receive (2,M1) with probability 1/2. This is
distinguishable from any outcome of OT 12 (M1, M1) so, in the case of PSE, B could detect that he is being cheated.
Implementations of the Oblivious Transfer do provide the index information, even though sometimes it is not
mentioned [6]. In other formulations of the OT the receiver can actually select which message he wants to receive, so
this problem is irrelevant.
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PSE (A, B, {ai }i , {bi }i) {
for i = 1 to n do
OT 12 (A, B, ai , ai+n)
OT 12 (B, A, bi , bi+n)
next
for j = 1 to m do
for i = 1 to 2n do
A sends j th bit of ai to B
for i = 1 to 2n do
B sends j th bit of bi to A
next
}
Fig. 3. Partial secrets exchange protocol.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. The Oblivious Transfer can be implemented in the piprob-calculus, using the
probabilistic choice operator. In order to make it impossible to cheat, a server process is used to coordinate the
transfer. The processes of the sender and the server are the following:
OT 12 (m1,m2, cas)
1= casm1.casm2.0
S(cas, csb)
1= cas(m1).cas(m2).(cbs〈1,m1〉 +0.5 cbs〈2,m2〉)
where m1,m2 are the names to be sent. cas is a channel private to A and S and csb a channel private to B and S. Each
agent communicates only with the server and not directly with the other agent. B receives the message from the server
(which should be in parallel with A and B) by making an input action on csb.
It is easy to see that these processes correctly implement the Oblivious Transfer. The only requirement is that A
should not contain csb, so that he can only communicate with B through the server.
3.2. Partial secrets exchange protocol
This protocol is the core of three probabilistic protocols for contract signing, certified email and coin tossing, all
presented in [6]. It involves two agents, each having 2n secrets split into pairs, (a1, an+1), . . . , (an, a2n) for A and
(b1, bn+1), . . . , (bn, b2n) for B. Each secret consists of m bits. The purpose is to exchange a single pair of secrets
under the constraint that, if at a specific time B has one of A’s pairs, then with high probability A should also have
one of B’s pairs and vice versa.
The protocol, displayed in Fig. 3, consists of two parts. During the first part, A and B exchange their pairs of secrets
using OT 12 . After this step A knows exactly one-half of each of B’s pairs and vice versa. During the second part, all
secrets are exchanged bit per bit. Half of the received bits are already known from the first step, so both agents can
check whether they are valid. Obviously, if both A and B execute the protocol properly then all secrets are revealed.
The problem arises when B tries to cheat and sends incorrectly some of his secrets. In this case it can be proved
that with high probability some of the tests of A will fail causing A to stop the execution of the protocol and avoid
revealing his secrets. The idea is that, in order for B to cheat, he must send at least one-half of each of his pairs
incorrectly. However he cannot know which of the two halves has been already received by A during the first part of
the protocol. So a pair sent incorrectly will only have 1/2 probability of being accepted by A, leading to a total 2−n
probability of success.
Now imagine, as discussed in Section 3.1, that B executes OT 12 (B, A, bi , bi ), thus forcing A to receive bi . Now, in
the second part, he can send all {bi+n | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} incorrectly without failing any test. Moreover A cannot detect this
situation. If indexes are available A will receive (2, bi+n) with probability 1/2 and since he knows that bi+n is not the
second half of the corresponding pair he will stop the protocol.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. In this paragraph we present an encoding of the PSE protocol in the piprob-calculus.
Before giving the corresponding process there are two points worth discussing.
• The secrets exchanged by PSE should be recognizable, which means that agent A cannot compute B’s secrets, but
he can recognize them when he receives them. Of course a secret can be recognized only as a whole, no single bit
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A({ai j }i=1..2n, j=1..m, {bi }i=1..2n) 1=∏n
i=1 OT 12 (〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi ) |
csa1(〈k1, r1〉).let 〈r11, . . . , r1m〉 = r1 in . . . csan (〈kn, rn〉).let 〈rn1, . . . , rnm〉 = rn in
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi (x).νqsi (qsi 〈ki , ri 〉 | TestOT(i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏m
j=1 s j (x).cpa1 j . . . . cpa(2n) j .cp(d1 j ). . . . cp(d(2n) j ).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti (x).νtsi (tsi 〈ki , ri j , di j , d(i+n) j 〉 | Test(i, j)) |
tn+1(x).s j+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOT(i)
1= qsi (〈k, w〉).([k is 1][w is bi ]qi+1 | [k is 2][w is bi+n]qi+1)
Test(i, j)
1= tsi (〈k, w, x, y〉).([k is 1][w is x]ti+1 | [k is 2][w is y]ti+1)
Fig. 4. Encoding of PSE protocol.
can be recognized by itself. To implement this feature we allow B’s secrets to appear in A’s process, as if A knew
them. However we allow a secret to appear only as a whole (not decomposed) and only inside a test construct,
which means that it can only be used to recognize another message.
• In our analysis we need to detect the fact that an agent sends a specific bit in a certain position of a specific message.
Thus, in the implementation of PSE, each parameter ai j (resp. bi j ) is considered to take values from the domain
{0i j , 1i j }, where 0i j (resp. 1i j ) is a public channel but different for each i, j .
Note that having secrets composed by public bits can lead to guessing attacks by nondeterministic adversaries.
Many analysis tools for security protocols, such as the spi-calculus, do not allow the decomposition of secrets to
avoid such guesses. In our analysis, however, we express the correctness of a protocol as the equivalence with a
properly constructed specification. This only proves that the protocol will not reveal any secrets and is not related
with the adversary’s ability of guessing the secrets without interfering with any partner (of course, this is known to
happen with very small probability). Such attacks will apply to both the protocol and the specification.
The encoding for the general case of n pairs and m bits per message is displayed in Fig. 4. We denote by ai (resp.
bi ) the i th secret of A (resp. B) and by ai j (resp. bi j ) the j th bit of ai (resp. bi ). ri is the i th message received by
Oblivious Transfer and ki is the corresponding index.
The first part consists of the first 4 lines of the process definition. In this part A sends his pairs using OT 12 , receives
the ones of B and decomposes them. To check the received messages A starts a loop of n steps, each of which is
guarded by an input action on qi for synchronization. During the i th step, ri is tested against bi or bi+n depending on
the outcome of the OT, that is on the value of ki . The qsi channels are used to send the values to test to the TestOT
sub-process.3
The second part consists of a loop of m steps, each of which is guarded by an input action on s j . During each step
the j th bit of each secret is sent and the corresponding bits of B are received in di j . Then there is a nested loop of
n tests controlled by the input actions on ti . Each test, performed by the Test sub-process, ensures that B’s bits are
valid. Test(i, j) checks the j th bit of the i th pair. The bit received during the first part, namely ri j , is compared to di j
or d(i+n) j depending on ki . If the bit is valid, an output action on ti+1 is performed to continue to the next test. Again,
the tsi channels are used to send the necessary values to the Test sub-process.
Finally, an instance of the protocol is an agent A put in parallel with servers for all Oblivious Transfers:
I
1= A({ai j }i=1..2n, j=1..m, {bi }i=1..2n) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi ) | S(cbsi , csai )).
3 Note that we use the syntax c(〈x1, . . . , xn〉).P for c(x).let 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 = x in P .
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Aspec({ai j }i=1..2n, j=1..m, h) 1=∏n
i=1 OT 12 (〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi ) |
csa1(x) . . . csan (x).
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi (x).νqsi (qsi 〈x, x〉 | TestOTspec(i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏m
j=1 s j (x).cpa1 j . . . . cpa(2n) j .cp(x). . . . cp(x).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti (x).νtsi (tsi 〈x, x, x, x〉 | Testspec(i, j, h)) |
tn+1(x).s j+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOTspec(i)
1= qsi (x).qi+1
Testspec(i, j, h)
1=
{
tsi (x).(ti+1 +0.5 0) if h(i) = j
tsi (x).ti+1 otherwise
Fig. 5. A specification for PSE that depends on B’s behavior.
4. Verification of security properties
A well known method for expressing and proving security properties using process calculi is by means of
specifications. A specification Pspec of a protocol P is a process which is simple enough in order to prove (or accept)
that it models the correct behavior of the protocol. Then the correctness of P is implied by P ' Pspec where ' is
a testing equivalence. The idea is that, if there exists an attack for P , this attack can be modeled by a test O which
performs the attack and outputs ω if it succeeds. Then P should pass the test and since P ' Pspec, Pspec should also
pass it, which is a contradiction (no attack exists for Pspec).
However, in case of probabilistic protocols, attacks do exist but only succeed with a very small probability. So
examining only the ability of passing a test is not sufficient since the fact that Pspec has an attack is no longer
contradictory. Instead we will use a specification which can be shown to have a very small probability of being attacked
and we will express the correctness of P as P v Pspec where v is the testing preorder defined in Section 2.4. Then an
attack of high probability for P should be applicable with at least the same probability for Pspec which is contradictory.
4.1. Specifications for PSE
Let us recall the fairness property for the PSE protocol.
If B receives one of A’s pairs then with high probability A should also be able to receive one of B’s pairs.
First of all we must point out two important differences between this type of protocols and the traditional
cryptographic ones.
• In traditional protocols both A and B are considered honest. The purpose of the protocol is to ensure that no outside
adversary can access the messages being transferred.
On the other hand, in PSE the adversary is B himself, who might try to deviate from the protocol in order to get
A’s secrets without revealing his own ones.
• In traditional protocols the secrets must remain secret all the time. A and B always perform the same actions and
always want to communicate with each other.
On the other hand in PSE, A shows different behavior when B is honest from that in case of an attempt to cheat.
A is willing to reveal his secrets, only when B wants the same too.
A specification that depends on the behavior of B. A specification of a protocol shows the correct behavior of the
agents. Since A’s behavior depends on B it makes sense to have different specifications depending on B’s behavior.
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Aspec({ai j }i=1..2n, j=1..m, {bi }i=1..2n) 1=∏n
i=1 OT 12 (〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi ) |
csa1(x) . . . csan (x).
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi (x).νqsi (qsi 〈x, x〉 | TestOTspec(i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏n
i=1(!guessi +0.5 0) |∏m
j=1 s j (x).cpa1 j . . . . cpa(2n) j .cp(d1 j ). . . . cp(d(2n) j ).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti (x).νtsi (tsi 〈x, x, di j , d(i+n) j 〉 | Testspec(i, j)) |
tn+1(x).s j+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOTspec(i)
1= qsi (x).qi+1
Testspec(i, j)
1= tsi (〈k, w, x, y〉).([x is bi j ][y is b(i+n) j ]ti+1 | guessi (x).ti+1)
Fig. 6. A unique specification for the PSE protocol.
In [3] we proposed a specification for PSE that shows A’s behavior when B is trying to cheat and, moreover, depends
on how B is cheating. To model B’s intention to cheat we use a function h : {1..n} 7→ {1..m} that shows on which
bit B is going to cheat for each pair. So h(3) = 4 means that B is going to send the 4th bit of (at least) one of the 3rd
pair’s secrets incorrectly. We consider “cheating” to be a deviation from the protocol in a way that leads to a violation
of fairness. Thus, in order for B to cheat h must be defined on its whole domain. The goal is to exchange just one pair,
if at least one pair is sent correctly by B then fairness is not violated.
The specification is displayed in Fig. 5. As already discussed, it depends on B’s cheating behavior, that is on the
function h. The specification resembles a lot the protocol, with two major differences:
(1) The specification does not use any of its input (all input variables are replaced by x to point out this fact). Moreover
bi ’s are no longer used (thus they are removed from the parameter list).
(2) The specification does not test the received bits. In the first part, TestOTspec accepts all messages. In the second,
Testspec accepts all bits, except those on which B is known to cheat, which are accepted only with probability 1/2.
Using this specification we can prove the correctness of PSE. We can first show that the specification satisfies
fairness. Then we can show that the original protocol is weaker (wrt the testing preorder defined in Section 2.4) than
the specification if we consider only tests which cheat based on h. More details about this method can be found in [4].
However there is an important drawback for this approach. The specification is not unique but there are many
different versions, one for each possible function h. To prove the correctness of PSE one should consider all these
specifications and prove that the original protocol is weaker than each of them. A new approach that overcomes this
problem is discussed in the following section.
A unique specification for PSE. In the specification given in the previous section, we allowed the process to know
which bit will be sent incorrectly by B. This, however, led to many different specifications depending on the function
h. A different approach is to allow the process to know the message that it is about to receive. So, it can actually test
whether it is being cheated or not, without knowing it beforehand. However the tests should not be strict. Even if B
is sending incorrect data, the specification should accept it with a certain probability, in order to simulate the actual
protocol.
The new specification is displayed in Fig. 6. As already discussed it does not depend on h but it contains B’s secret
messages. Like the previous specification, it differs from the original protocol only on the definition of TestOT and
Test. The former accepts all messages without any test (as in the previous specification). The latter, however, tests all
incoming bits against the real ones. If the bits are correct they are accepted. However, even if the bits are not correct
they can be accepted if an input on channel guessi is possible. This channel denotes the fact that B was able to guess
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which part of pair i was received by A, thus he can send the other part incorrectly without being detected. This should
happen with probability 1/2 for each pair, which is modeled by the sub-process
∏n
i=1(!guessi +0.5 0) that runs in
parallel with the tests. Note that the guess is made once for each pair, if succeeded then B can send all bits of the
corresponding pair incorrectly without being detected.
It is worth noting that, even though this specification seems complicated, it was constructed using a standard
technique, the same that was used to prove authenticity in [1]. Namely, when we want to prove that an agent receives
a message correctly, we can replace the received message by the correct one, as if he already knew it. The above
specification is intuitively fair since A at each step can verify with high probability that he received B’s secrets
correctly before proceeding to the next step.
In the rest of the paper we are only considering this improved version of the specification and we use it to prove the
correctness of PSE. To achieve that we first show that the specification satisfies the fairness property. Then we prove
that the original protocol is weaker than this specification wrt the testing preorder.
4.2. Proving the correctness of PSE
Correctness of the specification. First we show that the specification is indeed a proper specification for PSE with
respect to fairness. This means that, if B does not reveal his secrets then A should reveal his own ones with very small
probability. So suppose that B wants to cheat and let l be the maximum number of bits that B is willing to reveal for
his secrets. So, since one pair is enough for A, B should send at least one of the first l + 1 bits of each of his pairs
incorrectly.
As we already discussed Aspec knows all the correct bits of B’s secrets and he can test them when they are received.
The sub-process Testspec(i, j) will succeed with probability 1 if bi j and b(i+n) j are sent correctly, but only with
probability 1/2 if not (since channel guessi is activated only with probability 1/2). If the test fails then the whole
process stalls. Since incorrect bits will be sent for all pairs in the first l + 1 steps, the total probability of advancing to
step l + 2 and revealing its l + 2 bits is 2−n .
This means that Aspec satisfies fairness. If B at some point of the protocol has l bits of one of A’s pairs, then with
the probability of at least 1 − 2−n , A will have l − 1 bits of at least one of B’s pairs. If l = m (B has a whole pair)
then A should have at least m − 1 bits and the last bit can be easily computed by trying both 0 and 1. In other words
B cannot gain an advantage of more than one bit with probability greater than 2−n .
Relation between A and Aspec. Having proved the correctness of the specification with respect to fairness, it remains
to show its relation with the original protocol. Proving A v Aspec means to prove that if A is vulnerable with high
probability to an attack O , then Aspec will be also vulnerable with at least the same probability. Since we know that
the probability of a successful attack for Aspec is very small, we can conclude that an attack on A is very unlikely.
An instance of the specification is a process Aspec put in parallel with servers for all Oblivious Transfers:
Ispec
1= Aspec({ai j }i=1..2n, j=1..m, {bi }i=1..2n) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi ) | S(cbsi , csai ))
PSE will be considered correct wrt fairness if:
I v Ispec.
Theorem 10. PSE is correct with respect to fairness.
Proof. We want to prove that I v Ispec. The two processes differ only in TestOT and Test sub-processes. We define
Iw to be the same as I after replacing TestOT by TestOTw and Test by Testw defined as:
TestOTw(i)
1=
{
TestOT(i) if i ≥ w
TestOTspec(i) otherwise
Testw(i, j)
1=
{
Test(i, j) if i ≥ w
Testspec(i, j) otherwise.
The idea is that Iw behaves as the specification for the first w− 1 pairs and as the original protocol for the other ones.
Since I = I1 and Ispec = In+1 we can prove the correctness of PSE by induction on w and it suffices to show that
Iw v Iw+1 ∀w ∈ {1..n}. (6)
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Iw and Iw+1 differ only in the TestOTw(i) and Testw(i, j) sub-processes for i = w. Concerning TestOT we have:
TestOTw(w, j) = qsi (〈k, w〉).
([k is 1][w is bi ]qw+1 | [k is 2][w is bi+n]qw+1)
TestOTw+1(w, j) = qsi (x).qw+1.
Since k can only have one value, the one branch of TestOTw(w, j) will stall. So TestOTw+1 is the same as TestOTw
except that it does not test anything, so it is easy to see that TestOTw v TestOTw+1.
Since v is a precongruence, we can replace the TestOTw sub-processes in Iw by TestOTw+1. If K is the resulting
process, we have that Iw v K . Now K and Iw+1 differ only in Testw process. However Testw is not smaller than
Testw+1 so we cannot replace the first by the second.
In order to overcome this problem we notice that rw and kw were received through the csaw channel. Since we
suppose that only A contains any of the csai channels, rw must have been transferred using the Oblivious Transfer
server S(bsw, saw). This process receives two values m1,m2 and sends one of them, each with probability 1/2. We
suppose that m1 = bw and m2 = bw+n , that is the correct wth pair of B has been sent by the Oblivious Transfer
(otherwise TestOT(w) would stall with probability at least 1/2 and we could easily prove Iw v Iw+1). So rw will be
equal to bw (and kw = 1) or bw+n (and kw = 2), each with probability 1/2.
We define:
P1 =
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([1 is 1][bw j is x]tw+1 | [1 is 2][bw j is y]tw+1)
≡
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).[bw j is x]tw+1
P2 =
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([2 is 1][b(w+n) j is x]tw+1 | [2 is 2][b(w+n) j is y]tw+1)
≡
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).[b(w+n) j is y]tw+1.
Also let
Q =
(
m∏
j=1
Testw+1(w, j)
)
| (!guessw +0.5 0)
=
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([x is bw j ][y is b(w+n) j ]tw+1 | guessw(x).tw+1) | (!guessw +0.5 0).
We can show that P1 +0.5 P2 v Q +0.5 Q. Both processes can perform only tw+1 actions. With probability 1/2,
guessw will be activated and Q can perform all actions without testing. So if P1 +0.5 P2 passes a test with greater
probability than Q +0.5 Q then this probability should be more than 1/2 so both P1 and P2 should pass it. But in this
case the corresponding tests of P1, P2 should succeed which means that x = bw j and y = b(w+n) j so the test of Q
should also succeed. So
P1 +0.5 P2 v Q +0.5 Q. (7)
Finally let C be a context constructed from K by replacing Testw by a hole. By Lemma 8 we can perform the choice of
the Oblivious Transfer in the beginning, so K will be testing equivalent toC[P1]+0.5C[P2]. MoreoverC[Q]+0.5C[Q]
will be testing equivalent to Iw+1. By Corollary 9 and Eq. (7) we have C[P1] +0.5 C[P2] v C[Q] +0.5 C[Q] which
implies K v Iw+1.
Since Iw v K , the Eq. (6) is true and we can finish the proof by an induction on w. 
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5. Related work
Security protocols have been extensively studied during the last decade and many formal methods have been
proposed for their analysis. However, the vast majority of these methods refer to nondeterministic protocols and are
not suitable for the probabilistic setting, since they do not allow one to model random choices. One exception is the
work of Aldini and Gorrieri [2], where they use a probabilistic process algebra to analyze fairness in a nonreputation
protocol. Their work is close to ours in spirit, although technically it is quite different. In particular, we base our
analysis on a notion of testing while theirs is based on a notion of bisimulation.
With respect to the application, the results the most related to ours come from Norman and Schmatikov [11,12],
who use probabilistic model checking to study fairness in two probabilistic protocols, including the Partial Exchange
Protocol. In particular, in [12] they model the PSE using Prism, a probabilistic model checker. Their treatment however
is very different from ours: their model describes only the “correct” behavior for both A and B, as specified by
the protocol. B’s ability to cheat is limited to prematurely stopping the execution, so attacks in which B deviates
completely from the protocol are not taken into account. Having a simplified model is important in model checking
since it helps in overcoming the search state explosion problem, thus making the verification feasible.
The results in [12] show that with probability 1, B can gain a one bit advantage, that is he can get all m bits of a
pair of A by revealing only m−1 bits of his. This is achieved simply by stopping the execution after receiving the last
bit from A. Moreover a method of overcoming the problem is proposed, which gives this advantage to A or B, each
with probability 1/2. It is worth noting that this is a very weak form of attack and could be considered as negligible,
since A can compute the last bit very easily by trying both 0 and 1. Besides a one bit advantage will always exist in
contract signing protocols, simply because synchronous communication is not feasible.
In our approach, by modeling an adversary as an arbitrary piprob-process we allow him to perform a vast range of
attacks including sending messages, performing calculations, monitoring public channels etc. Our analysis shows not
only that a one bit attack is possible, but more important that no attack to obtain an advantage of two or more bits exists
with nonnegligible probability. Moreover our method has the advantage of being easily extendable. For example, treat-
ing more sessions, even an infinite number of ones, can be done by putting many copies of the processes in parallel.
Of course, the major advantage of the model checking approach, with respect to ours, is that it can be totally
automated.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we examined a method to analyze probabilistic security protocols using process calculi. The main tool
for this analysis is the piprob-calculus, a probabilistic variant of the pi -calculus. The probabilistic choice, provided by
piprob, allowed us to encode the Partial Exchange Protocol, a probabilistic protocol based on the Oblivious Transfer. In
order to prove the correctness of this protocol, we defined various preorders between piprob-processes and examined
their properties. Then we presented a properly constructed specification and showed that it is stronger than the original
protocol, thus proving that the possibility of success for any attack is very small.
Our results show that process-calculi techniques can be successfully applied to security protocol analysis. There
are various advantages for this approach. First of all the use of process calculi allows us to use the rich set of concepts
and techniques developed by the concurrency theory community. The proofs obtained are general, covering every
possible adversary and are not instance based as in model checking techniques. Moreover process calculi allow the
analysis of a protocol in a more complex environment, having for example many agents and multiple simultaneous
instances of a protocol. It is worth noting that many attacks of well-known protocols only appear in such situations.
In [5] an algorithm for deciding may-testing is presented, for fully probabilistic automata. We believe that this
result can be extended to the probabilistic automata defined in section 1.2, giving the ability prove automatically the
correctness of probabilistic security protocols.
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